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INTERPRETING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.† 
ABSTRACT 
   Justice Holmes famously observed that “[g]reat cases . . . make 
bad law.” The problem may be especially acute in the domain of 
national security, where presidents frequently interpret their own 
powers without judicial review and where executive precedents play a 
large role in subsequent interpretive debates. On the one hand, some 
of the historical assertions of presidential authority that stretch 
constitutional and statutory language the furthest seem hard to 
condemn in light of the practical stakes. On the other hand, to credit 
the authority of executive precedent risks leaving the president 
dangerously unbound. 
   To address the conundrum posed by executive precedent, this 
Article proposes a two-tiered theory for the interpretation of 
presidential powers. Framed as an analogy to a position in moral 
philosophy known as “threshold deontology,” two-tiered interpretive 
theory treats rules that restrict executive power as normally inviolable, 
not subject to a case-by-case balancing analysis. Analogously to 
threshold deontology, however, two-tiered theory also recognizes that 
when the costs of adherence to ordinary principles grow exorbitantly 
high, extraordinary interpretive principles should govern instead and 
should result in the upholding of broad presidential power. For 
reasons that the Article explains, resort to extraordinary reliance on 
second-tier justifications for assertions of sweeping executive 
authority involves a legal analogue to “dirty-handed” moral conduct 
and should be labeled accordingly. And executive precedents set in 
extraordinary, second-tier cases should not apply to more ordinary 
ones. Through its conjunction of elements, two-tiered interpretive 
theory furnishes analytical and rhetorical safeguards against executive 
overreaching, but also allows accommodations for truly extraordinary 
cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With characteristically pithy perspicacity, Justice Holmes 
famously worried that “[g]reat cases . . . make bad law.”
1 The problem 
with great cases has two aspects. First, as Holmes noted, 
extraordinary practical pressures may distort judicial judgment about 
how to resolve particular high-stakes controversies.
2 Second, rules of 
decision framed for great cases—even if appropriate to their exigent 
facts—may threaten to contaminate the resolution of future, more 
 
  1.  N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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ordinary cases.
3 To quote another splendid Justice, a rule crafted for a 
rare and regrettable emergency may thereafter “lie[] about like a 
loaded weapon,”
4 risking future damage to previously long-settled 
legal, political, and moral ideals. 
Although Justice Holmes warned about great cases with judicial 
decisionmaking in mind, the problems to which he called attention 
can arise just as acutely with respect to constitutional and statutory 
interpretation by the executive branch, especially within the domains 
of foreign policy and national security. Because disputes about the 
outer limits of presidential power to keep the nation safe and to 
manage international affairs seldom ripen into justiciable 
controversies,
5 the president—aided by a team of lawyers—frequently 
functions as the principal precedent-setter in these areas.
6 Rarely, if 
ever, does the president claim a power to violate the law. Instead, the 
president, with assistance from the White House or Justice 
Department legal staff, issues opinions justifying assertions of 
executive authority under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.
7 Some of the precedential decisions thus reached come in the 
kind of great cases to which Justice Holmes referred. Ready examples 
emerge from the actions of President Abraham Lincoln in the early 
days of the Civil War, when he concluded that the emergency 
rendered it constitutionally permissible for him to take steps that 
would almost surely have been legally impermissible in less 
extraordinary times.
8 Equally precedential decisions come when 
presidents and administration lawyers determine the applicability of 
precedents set in genuinely great cases to less exigent circumstances. 
 
 3.  Cf. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1097 (2003) (“[T]here is a strong probability that measures 
used by the government in emergencies will eventually seep into the legal system even after the 
crisis has ended.”). 
  4.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 5.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 436–38 (2012). 
 6.  See id. at 460 (noting the frequency of executive-branch reliance on executive 
precedent, even in the absence of acquiescence by other branches, and observing that “there are 
plausible grounds for even nonexecutive actors to credit patterns of executive practice, at least 
in some circumstances”). 
  7.  For a caustic critique of the legal analysis thus produced, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE 
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 98–116 (2010). For a rejoinder, see Trevor 
Morrison,  Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV.  L.  REV. 1688, 1692 (2011) (book review) 
(arguing that Professor Ackerman’s “oversimplified account obscures the constraints built into 
the current institutional arrangement”). For further discussion, see infra note 62.  
 8.  See infra notes 42–57 and accompanying text. FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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Professor Bruce Ackerman thus notes the tendency of presidents 
to justify actions that would otherwise be patently illegal or 
unconstitutional by arguing that executive precedent either glosses or 
displaces otherwise applicable norms.
9 He caricatures the resulting 
form of legal argument as follows: it is constitutionally permissible for 
the president to act unilaterally, despite the appearance of legal 
constraints, because “[t]hat’s what Abe Lincoln did in the early 
months of the Civil War [and] that’s what FDR did during the Great 
Depression.”
10 According to Professors Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule, our system has so evolved that law no longer meaningfully 
constrains the president, though political checks continue to operate.
11 
In this Article, I propose a response to the problems posed by 
great cases involving claims of presidential power—and executive 
precedents construing presidential powers very broadly—in the 
domains of war and national security. My proposal depends on an 
analogy between constitutional law and moral theory. In my view, the 
“threshold deontological” position that some moral prohibitions 
cease to bind absolutely when the costs of adherence grow excessive,
12 
and the similar idea that public officials sometimes appropriately 
acquire morally “dirty hands,”
13 can illuminate thinking about 
presidential powers and the proper role of precedent in defining 
them. The underlying premise of these approaches, which I shall 
summarize under the rubric of “two-tiered morality,” holds that 
morality operates on two levels. First, there is the level of ordinarily 
applicable moral rules, such as those, for example, that forbid lying, 
killing, and the deliberate infliction of harm. Second, there is a level 
at or above which the costs to others of adhering to the applicable 
rules grow so exorbitant that it becomes morally untenable to do so. 
Under such circumstances, a morally conscientious official has no 
choice but to do what ordinary morality forbids. Nevertheless, the 
underlying prohibition remains unmodified, and an official, though 
having done what she morally had to do, has acted regrettably and 
may even have done a “wrong,” as reflected in the metaphorical 
suggestion that she thereby gets dirty hands. 
 
  9.  ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 73. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 14–15 (2010). 
 12.  See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
160, 161–62 (1973). FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
2013]  INTERPRETING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 351 
Pursuing the analogy afforded by threshold deontology, I argue 
in this Article that we should conceptualize the rules of constitutional 
and statutory interpretation applicable to claims of presidential power 
as possessing a bifurcated structure. Ordinary rules, which apply in 
ordinary cases, may, with relative frequency, yield the conclusion that 
the president is constrained in ways that the president, for policy 
reasons, would not wish to be constrained. But in highly exigent cases, 
I argue, different rules of constitutional and statutory interpretation 
govern. When consequence-based imperatives possess sufficient 
urgency, it is right to conclude, as a matter of law, that the president 
can do some things that would be flatly illegal or unconstitutional 
under the ordinarily applicable rules.
14 This conclusion holds even in 
situations in which part of the purpose of the usual rules may be to 
circumscribe officials’ discretion and to stop them from doing what 
they deem wise, expedient, or even prudentially necessary on a case-
by-case basis. Nevertheless, by analogy to the moral wrongs that 
threshold deontology sometimes regards as lesser evils, some 
presidential actions that are justified only pursuant to the second-tier 
principles governing exigent cases should be regarded as lesser legal 
evils that are regrettably in breach of ordinary legal and constitutional 
ideals that emergency does not eradicate. By marking extraordinary 
claims of executive authority as tainted in this way, we would equip 
ourselves with the best intellectual, legal, and political tools for 
stopping what was lamentably necessary in one case from evolving 
into normal operating procedure in others. Going forward, I shall 
thus argue, we should distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary 
claims of presidential power; limit extraordinary claims to truly 
extraordinary cases; parse precedents much more closely to ascertain 
whether they correctly apply this distinction; and accord strong 
precedential authority only to past presidential actions and practices 
that emerge as adequately justified under the appropriately 
applicable rules. 
The novelty of my proposal that we embrace a two-tiered theory 
of constitutional and statutory interpretation inheres in its status as a 
legal theory, framed to fit and rationalize much, though not all, of 
historical and current U.S. legal practice, and in the resources it 
 
 14.  Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1257, 1257 (2004) (“The Constitution itself embraces an overriding principle of constitutional 
and national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of construction for the document’s 
specific provisions and that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific 
constitutional requirements.”). FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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provides for identifying and challenging executive overreaching. A 
large political philosophical literature discusses the emergency 
powers, if any, that a well-designed constitution would assign to the 
executive.
15 By contrast, my aim and method are “interpretive” in the 
sense in which Professor Ronald Dworkin uses that term:
16 I seek to 
offer an account that not only fits our historical and contemporary 
practices for gauging the scope of executive authority, but also casts 
those practices in the best normative light and thus offers attractive 
guidance for the future. That guidance crucially involves a strategy of 
identifying even justified invocations of emergency interpretive 
principles as inherently regrettable or even dirty-handed and of 
resisting the spread of principles framed for great cases to more 
ordinary ones, even in the field of national security.
17 By invoking 
moral and political philosophy to shape the development of a legal 
interpretive theory, this Article also distinguishes itself from 
arguments that officials confronted with emergencies are morally 
justified in acting extralegally.
18 
The Article’s interpretive methodology, as informed by an 
analogy to moral philosophy, also distinguishes it from constitutional 
scholarship that has debated the scope of presidential war powers on 
exclusively historical and functional grounds, often without reference 
to issues of statutory interpretation. To neglect statutes and issues 
involving their interpretation is myopic. As Professors David Barron 
and Martin Lederman have shown, Congress frequently enacts 
legislation that restricts or might be interpreted to restrict presidential 
 
  15.  That literature notably includes JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374–
79 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); NICCOLÒ  MACHIAVELLI,  The 
Prince, in THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 1, 56–57 (Max Lerner ed., Luigi Ricci trans., 
Random House 1950) (1532); and CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS 
ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1985) (1922). 
Distinguished recent contributions include DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: 
LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006); NOMI CLAIRE LAZAR, STATES OF EMERGENCY 
IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES (2009); and HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: 
THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER (1989). 
 16.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239, 255–58 (1986) (maintaining that proposed 
interpretations must be judged by the sometimes competing criteria of “fit” and normative 
attractiveness). 
 17.  Cf. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 
1404 (1989) (observing that “[e]mergency rule has become permanent”); Paulsen, supra note 14, 
at 1257–60 (proposing special interpretive principles for cases of constitutional necessity without 
addressing problems involving the contamination of nonemergency cases by principles framed 
in ones of genuine exigency). 
 18.  See generally, e.g., Gross, supra note 3. FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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authority, even with respect to the Commander-in-Chief power.
19 We 
need a theory addressing the proper interpretation of such legislation. 
The Article unfolds as follows: Part I first elaborates the 
constitutional intuition that extraordinary interpretive principles 
should apply to a few high-stakes cases, then juxtaposes that intuition 
with grounds for justified anxiety that allowing legal accommodations 
for great cases may create bad law. Against the background of that 
juxtaposition, Part II introduces threshold deontological moral theory 
as a potential source of analogical guidance. Applying the analogy 
that threshold deontology affords, Part II also offers a provisional 
statement of, and defends, a two-tiered approach to statutory and 
constitutional interpretation. Part III moves from a largely conceptual 
defense of the idea of a two-tiered interpretive theory to the 
development of a framework for analyzing particular cases. More 
specifically, Part III frames the questions to which a fully specified 
two-tiered theory would need to supply answers, as illustrated by 
discussions of concrete cases. Part IV considers the proper application 
of two-tiered theory to past executive precedents, including those 
emerging from “great cases,” and offers a set of prescriptions for 
ensuring that reliance on precedent, and especially executive 
precedent, does not subvert the analytical structure that two-tiered 
theory otherwise mandates. 
I.  OUR CURRENT PREDICAMENT REGARDING CLAIMS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
At least in academic circles, the notion has gained astonishingly 
broad currency—including respectful consideration even from those 
who ultimately reject it—that the president possesses substantially 
unlimited powers, especially in the domain of national security. With 
some academic support, the George W. Bush administration 
defended a sweeping view of inherent presidential powers related to 
national defense.
20 Those powers, the administration argued, lay 
 
 19.  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947–48 (2008).  
  20.  The Bush administration not only claimed unilateral authority to prosecute a war in 
Iraq without congressional authorization if it so chose (though it later opted to seek, and won, 
such authorization), see LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 215–30 (2d ed., rev. 2004), 
but also maintained that Congress was wholly impotent to enact legislation restricting the 
president’s authority to respond to perceived national security threats, see, e.g., Memorandum 
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Deputy 
Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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beyond the reach of Congress to regulate. Professors Posner and 
Vermeule offer a more qualified claim about the capacity of law to 
restrict the president, but also one that sweeps more broadly with 
respect to subject matter. According to them, “law does little to 
constrain the modern executive” at all,
21 as illustrated and established 
by past “showdowns” in which other branches have acceded to claims 
of presidential power.
22 
The view that the president is almost totally unconstrained by 
law seems to me to border on the unintelligible. By constituting the 
office of president, and the surrounding network of other offices with 
distinctive responsibilities, law establishes what it means to be 
president.
23 Given what it means for someone to hold the office of 
president under a Constitution that also creates a Congress and a 
judicial branch, and confers individual rights, the president cannot, 
unilaterally, raise tax rates on the wealthy, confer life-tenured 
judgeships on men and women whom the Senate will not confirm, or 
incarcerate citizens who have not taken up arms against the United 
States or been convicted of crimes. As a conceptual matter, the 
alternative to a legally constrained president is not a legally 
unconstrained president, but rather no president at all (as opposed to 
a constitutional dictator or supreme potentate, for example).
24  
 
Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 214 (Sept. 25, 
2001). For examples of academic discussions roughly in line with the Bush administration’s 
position, see generally Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional 
Authority To Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That 
Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2002); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in Chief Power, 40 GA. L. REV. 807 (2006); 
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other 
Means]; and John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002). For 
critical discussion of the Bush administration’s positions regarding executive power, see 
generally, JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR 
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008); and CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE 
RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2007).  
 21.  POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11, at 15. For a detailed critique of the empirical 
claim that executive power has become substantially unconstrained, see generally JACK 
GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012). 
 22.  See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11, at 67–83. 
 23.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 986–89 
(2009).  
 24.  See id.  See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential 
Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013) (identifying 
mechanisms of legal constraint on the president).  FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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Much more plausible is the notion that presidents, although 
constrained by law in many respects, are—and frequently should be—
able to construe their powers very expansively, or to read limits on 
their powers as narrow to the point of vanishing, in times of perceived 
emergency. In this Part, I shall first develop the constitutional 
intuition that special interpretive rules should apply, with the effect of 
relaxing restrictions on presidential power that otherwise would 
govern, in great, emergency, or high-stakes cases. I shall then 
elaborate the concern that this intuition should be rejected based on 
the Holmesian premise that “[g]reat cases . . . make bad law.”
25 
Finally, I shall explain how the conjunction of point and counterpoint 
with respect to these matters frames the challenge that the remainder 
of this Article addresses. 
A.  The Constitutional Intuition That Special Rules Apply to the 
Determination of Presidential Powers in Exigent Cases 
Justice Jackson’s much-celebrated concurring opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
26 the leading Supreme 
Court case on presidential powers, highlighted the significance of 
determining whether the president acts with the authorization of 
Congress, acts in a context to which Congress has not spoken, or acts 
in the teeth of a congressional prohibition.
27 This is an extremely 
helpful categorization, as reflected in the widespread 
acknowledgment that Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence 
provides the framework for analysis of presidential power.
28 As 
Youngstown illustrates, however, an important prior question will 
often involve the interpretation of a statute. In Youngstown, a 
majority of the Justices read a statute giving some powers to the 
president as impliedly denying him others. In other cases, by contrast, 
the Supreme Court has construed seemingly limited grants of 
presidential power as tacit approvals of broader assertions of 
executive authority.
29 
 
 25.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
  26.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 27.  See id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 28.  See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (referring to “Justice Jackson’s 
familiar tripartite scheme” as “the accepted framework” for evaluating claims of executive 
power). 
  29. See,  e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677–80 (1981).  FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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In considering whether great, emergency, or high-stakes cases 
call for the recognition of presidential powers that could not be 
persuasively justified if the stakes were lower, it may help to start 
with cases of statutory interpretation. Although I do not wish to 
overstate my claim, in statutory cases we may have a clearer sense of 
what “ordinary” interpretation would be—that is, of how we would 
construe statutory language in the absence of a plausible claim of 
exigency—than we would in pure cases of constitutional 
interpretation, in which tradition teaches that “we must never forget, 
that it is a constitution we are expounding.”
30 
Even in statutory cases, no general claim about the nature of 
interpretation can wholly escape controversy. For example, textualists 
and “new textualists” endorse one set of methodological principles, 
while purposivists embrace another.
31 Nevertheless, these and nearly 
all other theories of statutory interpretation define themselves partly 
in opposition to the pervasively pragmatic view that statutes should 
always be interpreted to reach whatever result would have the best 
consequences, all things considered.
32 In contrast with such thorough-
going pragmatism, other theories impose significant constraints, even 
though they characteristically permit or require some sensitivity to 
consequences. 
For purposes of argument, let us assume, then, that the adherents 
of one interpretive theory or another would sometimes regretfully 
conclude that a statute either fails to give the president a power, or 
precludes the president from exercising a power, that they think it 
desirable for the president to have. Such a conclusion, we might say, 
would reflect the outcome of ordinary statutory interpretation. And 
ordinarily we would expect those with interpretive authority to live 
with the conclusion that ordinary statutory interpretation—conducted 
pursuant to their methodology, whatever that methodology might 
be—generates. 
In some cases, however, it may seem obvious that both the 
Supreme Court and executive officials have strained to reach the 
conclusion that the president is not relevantly constrained, despite 
 
  30.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
  31.  For a highly illuminating overview of the overlap and divergence of these two 
approaches, see generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). 
  32. See  RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 50 (2003) (defining 
pragmatism as “judg[ing] proposals by the criterion of what works,” as measured by the 
“concrete consequences for a person’s happiness and prosperity”). FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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obstacles that nearly any interpretive theory would interpose. It is 
hard to give examples, because what would count as straining or 
stretching depends on the theory with which one begins, and I do not 
mean to identify a preferred theory against which to measure 
deviations. But I suspect that nearly everyone may sometimes feel 
sympathy for those who have struggled to rationalize conclusions that 
would be difficult to justify within their ordinarily applicable theories. 
For many, an example may come from the effort of then-Attorney 
General Robert Jackson to read pertinent statutes as not barring the 
destroyers-for-bases trade with Great Britain that President Franklin 
Roosevelt effected when Britain stood virtually alone against Nazi 
Germany.
33 Among a series of legal obstacles, the gravest stemmed 
from a statute enacted in 1917 that barred the transfer of “any vessel 
built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war” to a nation at war.
34 
Jackson found the prohibition inapplicable because the over-age 
destroyers were not initially “built, armed, or equipped with 
any . . . intent or with reasonable cause to believe that they would ever 
enter the service of a belligerent.”
35 If we believe this interpretation of 
the statutory prohibition to be strained, but nevertheless justified 
under the circumstances, it may be a sense of the exigency of the 
situation that moves us,
36 and we may be provoked to ask whether, 
and if so how, exigency could matter to a question of statutory 
interpretation. In so saying, I assume that all statutory interpretation 
allows for some degree of sensitivity to consequences, but that a 
special sense of straining arises because the ordinary limits have been 
reached. We may feel a similar tug of legal impulses in considering 
actual and possible questions of presidential authority under the 
Constitution in any of Justice Jackson’s categories. Once again, I 
recognize that different interpreters will have different constitutional 
 
  33. See Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 484 (1940). For discussion of the episode, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE 
BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 194–200 (2010); and 
Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1042–47. For detailed criticism of the legal arguments on 
which the Roosevelt administration relied, see Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, A Divorce Waiting To 
Happen: Franklin Roosevelt and the Law of Neutrality, 1935-1941, 3 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 413, 473–
81 (1996).  
 34.  See Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, supra 
note 33, at 494 (quoting Act of June 15, 1917, Pub L. No. 65-24, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 222).  
 35.  Id. at 496 (emphasis added). 
  36.  For a discussion of the surrounding exigency, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 105–09 (First Mariner Books ed. 2004).  FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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theories.
37 It is also pertinent that the decisionmakers who determine 
the bounds of lawful presidential authority are likely to be executive-
branch officials, rather than courts.
38 Even so, I imagine that a 
genuine interpretive process will occur,
39 not just a pragmatic 
calculation of what the president can get away with,
40 and that 
concerned citizens will also apply one or another theory to gauge the 
president’s lawful authority. If the question is whether the normal 
application of an interpretive theory would justify a claim of 
presidential authority, for most theories, the answer surely will be 
“no” in  some cases. For many, Youngstown furnishes an example: 
President Harry Truman had neither statutory nor inherent 
constitutional authority to seize the nation’s steel mills under the 
circumstances.
41 
But it should again prove easy to think of cases in which courts as 
well as executive officials have strained to uphold assertions of 
presidential authority—and in which adherents of nearly any 
constitutional theory may feel sympathy for their efforts. Some of 
President Lincoln’s actions at the outset of the Civil War, as 
explained in his July 4 Message to Congress,
42 exemplify the kind of 
reasoning that I have in mind. During the period between the firing 
 
  37.  Prominent examples include originalism, see generally, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1999); Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,  in A   MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Professor 
John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcing approach, see  generally  JOHN  HART  ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Dworkin’s prescription 
to give a “moral reading” to language incorporating moral values, see R ONALD  DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S  LAW 1–15 (1996); and what Professor David Strauss has called common law 
constitutional interpretation, see generally David L. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).  
 38.  See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
  39. See,  e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
689, 724–25 (2008) (rejecting the view that executive officials and other nonjudges are 
unaffected by constitutional argumentation); Morrison, supra note 7, at 1714–15 (describing 
interpretive norms followed by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)). 
 40.  See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1404–05 
(2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11) (examining a rational-choice theory 
argument that “presidents follow the law not out of any normative obligation or the more 
specific duty to faithfully execute the laws but only when the cost-benefit metric of compliance 
is more favorable than that of noncompliance”).  
  41.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952). 
  42.  President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).  FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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on Fort Sumter on April 12 and the first subsequent convening of 
Congress on July 4, 1861, Lincoln, among other extraordinary actions,
 
ordered payments out of the Treasury to support an enlarged army 
and navy,
43 notwithstanding the provision of Article I, Section 9 that 
“[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law.”
44 He also authorized the suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus,
45 even though the constitutional 
authorization for suspensions comes in Article I,
46 which lists the 
powers of Congress, not in Article II, which vests executive power. 
When Chief Justice Taney then ruled that the president lacked 
suspension power and ordered the writ to issue in Ex parte 
Merryman,
47 Lincoln directed Union officers to defy the Chief 
Justice.
48 Once again, we may have some instinct—as Lincoln did—
that it was right to interpret the Constitution to let the president rise 
to the emergency, even if that conclusion requires extraordinary 
interpretive liberties. 
Even if instinctively sympathetic toward Lincoln, we might 
incline toward saying that, in at least some instances, the justification 
for his actions had to come from morality or necessity, not 
constitutional law. In a letter explaining some extraordinary actions 
during his presidency, Thomas Jefferson famously wrote that 
obedience to law is not necessarily a public official’s highest duty.
49 So 
we might, quite intelligibly, relegate questions about whether the 
president is justified in claiming powers that are difficult to sustain by 
ordinary interpretive methods to the realm of political morality and 
ask whether the president ought to defy the law.
50 
 
  43.  For a description and analysis of the steps that President Lincoln took before 
convening Congress, see DANIEL  FARBER,  LINCOLN’S  CONSTITUTION:  THE  NATION, THE 
PRESIDENT, AND THE COURTS IN A TIME OF CRISIS, 17–19 (2003); and Barron & Lederman, 
supra note 19, at 997–1005. 
 44.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
  45.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 998–99. 
  46.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
 47.  Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
  48.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 999. 
  49.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in BASIC WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682–83 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944). 
  50.  Oren Gross adopts substantially this approach in his much-discussed article, Chaos and 
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional? See generally Gross, supra 
note 3. For one extended discussion of Gross’s article, see David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: 
Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2026–
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Before doing so, however, we should heed an interesting 
ambivalence in the way that Lincoln set up his defense of asserting 
extraordinary powers. His July 4 message to Congress divided the 
actions that he had already taken during the secession crisis into two 
categories. After reciting a number of his initiatives, Lincoln said that 
“[s]o far all was believed to be strictly legal.”
51 He then began a 
discussion of actions falling within what he took to be a separate 
category, apparently involving steps that may not have been “strictly 
legal,” but that he nevertheless regarded as constitutionally 
permissible under the exigent circumstances.
52 
Only after introducing the distinction between actions that were 
strictly legal and those that he appeared to regard as justifiable only 
because of crisis-based imperatives did Lincoln advance his famous 
defense of unilateral presidential authority to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus. Noting that critics had maintained “that one who is 
sworn to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ should not 
himself violate them,”
53 Lincoln countered: “[A]re all the laws, but 
one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest 
that one be violated?”
54 Having framed this question, Lincoln insisted 
that it had not actually arisen. When the Constitution was properly 
read, he argued, it gave the executive the authority to suspend the 
writ when suspension was a practical necessity: “[A]s the provision 
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed 
the framers . . . intended, that in every case, the danger should run its 
course, until Congress could be called together; the very assembling 
of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the 
rebellion.”
55 
Although the train of Lincoln’s thought is not entirely clear, his 
remarks can be interpreted to suggest that constitutional legality 
operates at two levels. There is the ordinary level—what Lincoln 
categorized as the domain of the “strictly legal”—within which it 
would suffice to note the dictates of a law or constitutional provision 
that appears to speak precisely to the case at hand. Yet Lincoln also 
appears to contemplate another level, applicable in extraordinary 
 
  51.  President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, supra note 42, at 
428 (emphasis added). 
  52. See  id. at 429. 
  53. Id. at 429–30. 
  54. Id. at 430. 
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cases, in which rigid adherence to a single law or constitutional norm 
would have potentially grave, adverse implications for superveningly 
important constitutional values. In sufficiently momentous cases, 
Lincoln implied, strict legality may sometimes yield to a conception of 
what the Constitution authorizes or requires under extraordinary 
circumstances.
56 As Lincoln put it, “I felt that measures, otherwise 
unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to 
the preservation of the nation.”
57 
Here lies the germ of a two-tiered theory of executive power and 
of the appropriate interpretation of statutes and constitutional 
provisions bearing on executive power. Stated provisionally, the 
theory would be this: Within a two-tiered legal framework, two kinds 
of overrides of ordinarily applicable rules may be permissible when 
the costs of adhering to those rules grow exorbitantly high. First, 
ordinary rules of statutory interpretation may yield. Second, if no 
statutory authority can be found, and if ordinarily applicable 
constitutional principles would preclude the recognition of a 
presidential power, exigency may trigger principles of constitutional 
interpretation that provide the president with adequate constitutional 
grounds for doing something that is not “strictly legal,” because it 
violates applicable principles, but that is nevertheless ultimately 
constitutionally justified, as measured on another scale. 
This theory not only captures what I expect to be widely shared 
intuitions about the appropriate interpretation of the president’s 
powers in the cases that I have discussed, but also echoes with other 
doctrines in constitutional law. Insofar as individual rights are 
concerned, we may have an example of two-tiered constitutional 
thinking in cases governed by strict judicial scrutiny and the 
compelling interest test.
58 Under this test, courts enforce rights up to, 
but not above, the point at which countervailing governmental 
interests grow compelling.
59 Although not necessarily based on 
 
  56. See S CHLESINGER,  supra note 36, at 60 (“[W]here Jefferson, like Locke, saw 
emergency power as a weapon outside and beyond the Constitution, Lincoln suggested that 
crisis in some sense made it a constitutional power.”).  
  57.  Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 7 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 42, at 281 (emphasis added). 
  58. See  Paulsen,  supra note 14, at 1281–82. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict 
Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007) (discussing the historical origins and varying 
interpretations of the compelling interest test).  
 59.  See Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 807–08 
(2007) (arguing that the strict scrutiny test gauges whether genuine rights have been overcome 
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constitutional considerations, the necessity defense in criminal law 
may similarly reflect the premise that ordinarily applicable legal and 
moral rules are subject to override in exigent circumstances: the 
necessity defense generally applies when a defendant’s conduct was 
necessary to prevent a greater evil and no specific legal justification 
or excuse applies.
60 We may even have a notion of extraordinary 
constitutionality applicable to situations in which Congress and the 
president act in concert under Justice Jackson’s first Youngstown 
category.
61 But we do not have any comparably worked out notion 
regarding presidential interpretations of statutes or presidential 
power unsupported by congressional enactments. Once again, my 
provisional suggestion is that the elaboration of such a notion could 
substantially advance thought about constitutional law and statutory 
interpretation involving presidential powers. It could do so by 
clarifying why the law might occasionally tolerate what would 
otherwise be legally intolerable on the ground that it is a lesser legal 
evil, not an unproblematically justifiable application of a unitary, 
mutually reinforcing set of legal principles. 
B.  A Competing Worry 
With the provisional case for recognizing that special rules of 
statutory and constitutional construction apply to emergency cases 
now having been laid out, it is time to recall Justice Holmes’s worry 
that great cases—and ad hoc intuitions about how great cases ought 
to be decided—risk making bad law. As I emphasized earlier, the 
problem may inhere partly in the need for courts to make pressured 
judgments on such cases’ peculiar facts, but it also involves the 
operation, and occasions for the extension, of precedent. The cause 
for concern may grow especially acute, moreover, when the president 
and lawyers in the executive branch not only establish, but also apply, 
the central precedents.
62 This concern has two aspects. The first is that 
 
 60.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). See generally George C. Christie, The Defense 
of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975 (1999) 
(discussing the necessity defense). 
  61. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right 
plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be 
said . . . to personify the federal sovereignty.” (footnote omitted)). 
 62.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 88 (asserting that the “stream of authoritative-
looking opinions” produced by the OLC and the White House Counsel on the scope of 
presidential authority “is produced under conditions that allow short-term presidential FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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great cases such as those that I have discussed will establish 
precedents that are expressly cited and applied in more ordinary 
cases. The second is that acknowledgment of presidential authority to 
assert extraordinary powers in exigent cases involving national 
security will support patterns of analysis that categorically exempt 
claims of presidential authority from ordinary norms of constitutional 
and statutory interpretation. 
An example from 2011 may illustrate the latter ground for 
anxiety. When the Obama administration initially claimed 
constitutional authority to participate in air attacks in Libya without 
congressional authorization, officials argued that, as a number of 
executive precedents demonstrated, the Constitution granted the 
president unilateral power to order limited military operations, short 
of war, that he believed to be in the national interest.
63 Thereafter, a 
 
imperatives to overwhelm sober legal judgment”). In a response in which he dismisses 
Ackerman’s account as “oversimplified,” Dean Trevor Morrison emphasizes institutional 
restraints within the OLC. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1692. Yet even Morrison does not deny 
that the “OLC’s written opinions tend to be protective of executive power.” Id. at 1715. 
According to Morrison, of the 245 publicly released OLC opinions between the beginning of the 
Carter administration and the first year of the Obama administration, “193 opinions (79%) 
found in favor of the White House’s position without significant limitation, twenty (8%) 
provided a more mixed answer . . . , and thirty-two (13%) went predominantly against the White 
House.” Id. at 1717–18. Morrison believes that “the rate at which [the OLC’s] written opinions 
say yes to the President can be highly misleading . . . because many of OLC’s no’s” are tendered 
orally and “never result in written opinions.” Id. at 1719. But the written opinions appear to 
have a disproportionate precedential significance. A July 2010 OLC opinion expressly affirms 
that “OLC opinions should consider and ordinarily give great weight to any relevant past 
opinions of Attorneys General and the Office” and that they “should not lightly depart from 
such past decisions.” See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 
COLUM.  L.  REV. 1448, 1453 (2010) (quoting Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Attorneys of the Office, Re: 
Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 2 (July 16, 2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 63.  See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Authority To Use Military Force in Libya 6 
(Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf. 
The cited precedents included a “bombing in Libya (1986), an intervention in Panama (1989), 
troop deployments to Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), and Haiti (twice, 1994 and 2004), air 
patrols and airstrikes in Bosnia (1993–1995), and a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia (1999).” Id. 
at 7. The memorandum articulated two limiting principles on the president’s power: First, 
substantial national interests must justify the operations. Id. at 10. Second, the president may 
not have the power unilaterally to order operations that would amount to a “war” under the 
Declare War Clause. See id. In determining that Libya did not rise to that level, the 
memorandum relied heavily on the Haiti and Bosnia examples. See  Memorandum from 
Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric 
Holder, Att’y Gen., supra, at 9, 13. FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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further issue arose under the War Powers Resolution,
64 which 
provides that presidents must terminate any commitment of U.S. 
Armed Forces to “hostilities” within sixty days unless Congress has 
“declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of 
United States Armed Forces.”
65 At this point, relying almost wholly 
on executive precedent, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh 
argued that the involvement of U.S. forces in air operations against 
Libyan forces did not constitute “hostilities” within the meaning of 
the War Powers Resolution.
66 This otherwise tendentious construction 
rested almost wholly on past executive precedents established via 
previous presidentially mandated commitments of military personnel 
to Lebanon in 1983, Grenada in 1983, the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 
1988, and Somalia in 1993. In those cases, Koh noted, the executive 
concluded that “hostilities” did not occur, despite the presence of 
thousands of U.S. ground troops, combat, casualties, and a high risk 
of escalation.
67 According to Koh, these precedents, although never 
considered by any court, demonstrated that the term “hostilities” as 
used in the War Powers Resolution does not apply “when U.S. forces 
engage in a limited military mission that involves limited exposure for 
U.S. troops and limited risk of serious escalation and employs limited 
military means.”
68 
The premises of Koh’s precedent-based argument are familiar, 
but also unsettling. However one judges the specific arguments of the 
Obama administration, previous administrations have cited executive 
precedent to justify assertions of unilateral executive authority to do 
nearly anything that the president has deemed desirable in the name 
of national security, up to and including the initiation of war in every 
practical sense of the term.
69 The thought that past executive 
precedent would plausibly support presidential claims of unilateral 
 
  64.  War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 65.  See id. §§ 1543(a)(1), 1544(b). 
 66.  Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th 
Cong. 7 (June 28, 2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State). 
 67.  See id. at 15 & nn.15–16.  
 68.  Id. at 9. 
  69.  Probably the most dramatic example of an administration actually acting upon a claim 
of unilateral executive authority based largely on past executive precedent—on which the 
George W. Bush administration in turn relied in the OLC Memorandum of September 25, 
2001—involved entry into the Korean War. See  supra note 20 and accompanying text. The 
George H.W. Bush administration also claimed an independent executive authority to 
prosecute a war in the Persian Gulf, though it ultimately procured congressional authorization 
before doing so. See FISHER, supra note 20, at 171–72. FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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authority to initiate and prosecute a major and protracted war—for 
the Korean War does indeed supply such a precedent
70—ought to give 
pause.
71 An executive branch unbounded in national security matters 
by any legal limits that it has not chosen to acknowledge would 
deviate sharply from traditional notions of constitutional legality and 
the ideal of the rule of law.
72 Nevertheless, the idea that past executive 
practice—some of it developed under circumstances of genuine 
exigency—helps define the scope of current presidential authority is 
not easy simply to reject. 
In considering the relevance of historical practice to 
contemporary assessments of the president’s war powers, those who 
resist claims of substantially unfettered presidential power confront 
an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, it is hard, maybe impossible, 
to gauge presidential authority without reliance on historical practice 
and precedent.
73 In many respects, the text of the Constitution is 
vague, and the original public meaning often appears either 
comparably vague or uncertain. Under these circumstances, nearly all 
agree that historical practice can constitute a gloss on the 
 
  70.  At the time of the Korean intervention, Secretary of State Dean Acheson argued not 
only that the president had constitutional authority to commit U.S. troops unilaterally, but also 
that this authority lay beyond Congress’s power to regulate. See Barron & Lederman, supra 
note 19, at 1060–61. For critical discussion of the Truman administration’s decision not to seek 
congressional authorization, see FISHER, supra note 20, at 97–100. Fisher concludes that “[e]ven 
if a case could be made that the emergency facing Truman in June 1950 required him to act 
promptly without first seeking and obtaining legislative authority, nothing prevented him from 
returning to Congress and asking for a supporting statute for retroactive authority.” Id. at 100.  
 71.  But see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11, at 5 (“Executive government is best in 
the thin sense that there is no feasible way to improve upon it, under the conditions of the 
administrative state.”).  
 72.  See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks Executive, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 973, 1001–07 (2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11) (arguing in 
support of traditional constitutional constraints on the president’s national security powers).  
  73. See H AROLD  HONGJU  KOH,  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONSTITUTION:  SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 70 (1990) (describing the significance of “historical 
precedent that may be thought of as quasi-constitutional custom” (emphasis omitted)); 
SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 18 (describing how “life under the Constitution began,” early in 
constitutional history, “to define the meaning of the Constitution”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 997–1002 (2008) (explaining how 
“showdowns” between branches of government create precedents that influence future 
expectations and interactions between the branches). For an analysis of the proper role of 
nonjudicial precedent in settling separation-of-powers issues, see generally Bradley & Morrison, 
supra note 5; Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers 
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984).  FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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constitutional text.
74 Especially when historical practice is reasonably 
consistent across presidential administrations, it may capture 
accreting lessons about practical imperatives in an evolving world.
75 
On the other hand, in the domain of presidential powers, for all 
but the few who believe that Article II was originally intended and 
understood to give the president essentially limitless authority with 
respect to national security,
76 and that this allocation of power is 
desirable, it is difficult not to think that some precedents for 
assertions of presidential authority have gone too far. Indeed, looking 
to the future, those who believe that the president should be subject 
to any significant checks may view precedent-based reasoning as 
more nearly the problem than the solution to a problem.
77 Some of 
the troubling precedents involve claims of unilateral presidential 
authority that would persist even in the case of an attempted 
congressional prohibition.
78 Others assert latitudinarian 
interpretations of statutes, including the War Powers Resolution, 
 
  74. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 418 (“With some variations, the Supreme 
Court, executive-branch lawyers, and academic commentators have all endorsed the significance 
of such practice-based gloss.”); see also, e.g., American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 
414 (2003) (“Although the source of the President’s power to act in foreign affairs does not 
enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the 
Constitution has recognized the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our 
foreign relations.’” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) 
(“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued practice, known to and 
acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in 
pursuance of its consent . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil 
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915))); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (characterizing historical 
practice as a “gloss” on presidential power). 
  75. See,  e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at viii (observing that accretions of power to the 
presidency have been necessary “to meet the great crises” of U.S. history and “to overcome the 
tendency” of the separation of powers to promote “inertia”); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, 
at 428, 455–56 (discussing Burkean and related grounds for according significance to historical 
practice). 
  76. See,  e.g., Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means, supra note 20, at 174. A 
majority of war-powers scholars appear to take the view that the founding generation believed 
that presidents could not resort to military force without congressional authorization except in 
response to a sudden attack. See, e.g., JOHN  HART  ELY,  WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3–5 (1993); FISHER, supra note 
20, at 8, 12; William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power To Declare War, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 699–701 (1997); see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 696 
(concluding that “there is surprisingly little Founding-era evidence supporting the notion that 
the conduct of military campaigns is beyond legislative control and a fair amount of evidence 
that affirmatively undermines it”).  
  77. See,  e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 73. 
  78.  For a survey of these precedents, see Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 951–1098. FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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either to confer authority on the president or at least not to preclude 
actions that the president wants to take.
79 
In response, it is easy to say that emergency powers should be 
reserved for emergencies. But as history shows, there is a very real 
problem of normalization: powers created for emergencies spill over 
their originally intended banks and become the norm. If so, the 
solution to one problem—recognition of extraordinary presidential 
powers that seem necessary under conditions of genuine exigency—
may have created another. 
The question is whether there is a way to conceptualize and 
cabin emergency interpretive powers so that they do not become the 
norm, especially in a domain in which the executive branch is 
frequently the leading creator and interpreter of precedents. In my 
view, an analogy to positions in moral philosophy will suggest the 
outlines of an affirmative answer. 
II.  AN ANALOGY FROM MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
At the very least, important analogies exist between law and 
morality. If we take those analogies seriously, it will be sensible to ask 
whether moral theory might illuminate the situation of someone who: 
(1) believes that the president both is and ought to be subject to 
statutory and constitutional restrictions that can be identified through 
ordinary rules of statutory and constitutional interpretation in 
ordinary cases; yet (2) also believes that exceptions might be 
warranted when the president’s exercise of a normally forbidden 
power might achieve enormous benefits or avert extraordinarily dire 
results; and yet (3) further worries that it might prove analytically, 
psychologically, or politically impossible to stop emergency-based 
interpretation of executive power, if it is allowed, from expanding 
beyond its justifiable domain and becoming the operative norm in 
other cases. If such illumination can be found, it would most likely 
come from a moral theory that, analogously, posits the existence of 
moral norms that, though ordinarily unyielding, can be overcome in 
exigent cases, but only in exigent cases that are somehow narrowly 
defined and duly, though not excessively, stigmatized. Threshold 
deontology meets these specifications.
80 
 
  79.  One such example is the Obama administration’s precedent-based interpretation of the 
War Powers Resolution. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
  80.  For discussions of threshold deontology and of the leading criticisms directed against it, 
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A. Threshold  Deontology 
Threshold deontology begins with the premise that people have 
rights, rooted in their status as separate persons, that are not 
reducible to or derived from considerations of overall social welfare. 
But threshold deontology distinguishes itself from Kantianism and 
other absolutist theories by positing that some rights-based 
constraints on individual and governmental action hold only until the 
costs of adherence grow exorbitant.
81 At that point, a discontinuity 
occurs: consequentialist imperatives take practical precedence over 
otherwise inviolable principles.
82 Although conceptual logic does not 
dictate precisely where the relevant thresholds lie, defenders of 
threshold deontology have sometimes appealed to the idea of a 
“catastrophe” as providing at least an illustration of the need for 
deontological principles sometimes to give way, if not a specification 
of the point at which they would do so.
83  
Crucial to threshold deontology is its recognition of a category of 
cases in which consequence-based considerations take moral, action-
dictating precedence over individual rights that nevertheless retain 
their status as rights: exigency does not eradicate rights, even in cases 
of exigent emergency, when the violation of those rights is warranted, 
all things considered. If such a category can exist, it is probably 
because, as the philosopher Thomas Nagel has written, two distinct 
kinds of moral reason exert strong claims on us. One is deontological 
 
Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STANFORD  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 12, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ethics-
deontological. 
 81.  See T HOMAS  NAGEL,  War and Massacre,  in  MORTAL  QUESTIONS  53,  56  (1979) 
(acknowledging that “it may become impossible to adhere to an absolutist position” when 
“utilitarian considerations favoring violation are overpoweringly weighty and extremely 
certain”); Alexander & Moore, supra note 80 (noting the distinction between threshold 
deontology and more absolutist positions). 
  82. See C HARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (1978) (explaining that even absolute 
norms have boundaries and exceptions); JOHN  RAWLS,  Fifty Years After Hiroshima,  in 
COLLECTED PAPERS 565, 566–67 (Samuel Freedman ed., 1999) (noting that even under a “strict 
interpretation,” human rights might give way “in times of extreme crisis”); Michael S. Moore, 
Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280, 329 (1989) (arguing that “moral absolutes” 
can be overridden “when th[e] consequences are horrendous enough”). 
 83.  See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30 n.* (1974) (declining to 
consider whether “side constraints,” i.e. rights, might “be violated in order to avoid catastrophic 
moral horror”); Michael Otsuka, Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74, 
91 n.29 (1994) (“Warfare creates an atmosphere of emergency and catastrophe in which 
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or rights-based; the other, consequentialist or loosely utilitarian.
84 
According to Professor Nagel, rights-based or deontological moral 
theories generally provide the best overarching explanation of our 
considered moral judgments and should therefore be preferred. But 
the pull of consequentialist impulses does not wholly disappear, and, 
in cases of great consequence, conflicts can occur. Because rights exist 
apart from consequentialist imperatives, there is no common medium 
in which one can define the limits of the other. We therefore cannot 
say that considerations of overall welfare define or limit rights by 
marking their outer conceptual boundaries. We can say, however, 
that rights are sometimes overridden by concerns about consequences 
and that it may therefore be the lesser evil to violate one or another 
moral norm. Nevertheless, because the relevant norms are not 
effaced, neither are the rights that they define, and—in one version of 
threshold deontology—a person who violates such rights has done a 
wrong, even if that wrong is warranted under the circumstances.
85 
Political philosopher Michael Walzer offers a partially parallel 
account.
86 According to Walzer, moral principles that are not 
primarily consequentialist mark some actions as absolutely required 
and others as absolutely forbidden. Like threshold deontologists, he 
acknowledges that situations may arise in which adherence to moral 
norms would impose excessive costs, especially in cases involving 
officials responsible for public security and welfare. In such cases, 
Walzer maintains, the ordinarily applicable norms are overridden. 
Nevertheless, he insists, the ordinary norms do not cease to apply, 
and an official who violates them thereby acquires “dirty hands.”
87 
B.  Parallels in Legal Interpretation 
If the analogy afforded by threshold deontology has value for 
legal and constitutional theory, its utility will emerge along two 
dimensions. First, the analogy may help to illuminate how it might be 
that our notions of constitutional legality include elements that may 
sometimes come into conflict, or at least apparent conflict, with one 
 
  84.  THOMAS NAGEL, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in MORTAL QUESTIONS, supra note 81, 
at 75, 83–86; see also  NAGEL,  supra note 81, at 53–55; ROBERT  NOZICK,  PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXPLANATIONS 498 (1981). 
 85.  See NAGEL, supra note 81, at 67 (observing that even if “one has no choice but to do 
something terrible” because of the intolerable consequences of not doing so, “[i]t does not 
become all right”). 
  86. See Walzer, supra note 13, at 161–64.  
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another. Second, threshold deontology might provide resources for 
determining what to do, and also for characterizing the actions that 
are dictated, in cases presenting such conflicts.
88 
In my view, the existence of deep tension among fundamental 
legal norms is nearly self-evident in many high-stakes, emergency 
cases. On the one hand, we equate constitutional legality with 
adherence to rules, principles, or constraints that are not reducible to 
case-by-case determinations of what would be best under the 
circumstances, all things considered. Although nearly any theory of 
statutory or constitutional interpretation is likely to be applied in 
practice in a way that is context-sensitive,
89 every interpretive theory 
that is not avowedly pragmatist will insist that to engage in 
interpretation is to do something other than to calculate what would 
have the best consequences in every case. On the other hand, as much 
as we believe in fidelity to constitutional norms, most of us also 
accept the premise that the Constitution is “not a suicide pact”
90 and 
that it ought not be so interpreted, no matter what ordinary principles 
might dictate, as to promote genuinely disastrous consequences.
91 
Most of us may have similar instincts within the domain of statutory 
interpretation, in which a number of longstanding canons guide 
interpreters away from untoward and absurd results.
92 
If the duality that I have posited between imperatives to show 
fidelity to individual constitutional and legal norms and to avoid 
severely adverse impacts on the overall constitutional order exists, 
then we might still think that cases of conflict call for an ordinary 
balancing judgment in which one principle is deemed to outweigh 
another in the circumstance presented. In ordinary cases of balancing, 
 
 88.  Cf. MANSFIELD, supra note 15, at 204, 255 (maintaining that Lockean constitutional 
theory “contains the extraconstitutional within the constitution” and that “the American 
Constitution . . . constitutionalize[s] necessities in the manner of Locke” (emphasis omitted)). 
  89.  This may be especially true when the interpreters are executive officials who are 
subject to a variety of acutely practical and political pressures, especially insofar as their 
functions involve national security. See J ACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW 
AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 35 (2007) (observing that OLC opinions 
do not always aspire to be “politically neutral rulings [like those] from a court”).  
 90.  See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
 91.  But see Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1299, 1299–1300, 1319 (2004) (questioning whether the Constitution should always be construed 
to avoid severely harmful or even self-destructive results). 
  92. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388 (2003) 
(“From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the idea that 
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we may apprehend no deep conflict of values, and certainly no 
tragedy, and may see no reason to invoke notions of apology, regret, 
or dirty hands. In my view, however, a more perspicuous portrayal of 
constitutional law characterizes it as capable of generating dilemmas 
analogous to those that threshold deontology depicts within morality. 
The reason for adopting a dilemma-acknowledging account of 
constitutional legality has to do with what Professor Frederick 
Schauer has termed “the asymmetry of authority.”
93 If we accept, as 
we ought to, that nearly all rules are over- or underinclusive,
94 the 
question arises why any rulemaking authority might want to subject 
officials—including the president—to duty-establishing or 
constraining rules at all, rather than simply authorize them to do 
whatever would be best under the circumstances. A part of the 
answer involves distrust. Although individual officials, including the 
president, may think that they could achieve better results by 
deviating from the rules that the law has imposed, the law-creating 
authority may have imposed the rules precisely because it distrusted 
officials’ capacity to make unconstrained, case-by-case judgments.
95 
This, roughly speaking, is the situation that I imagine to exist when a 
president claims extraordinary interpretive liberties—as, for example, 
Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt did in the cases that I discussed 
above.
96 
Nevertheless, as those cases may illustrate, unforeseen and 
potentially catastrophic situations can materialize in which deviations 
from strict legality are necessary, or reasonably thought to be 
necessary, lest disaster occur. Although the obligation of fidelity to 
specific, constitutionally and statutorily established legal norms 
remains unaltered, consequence-based pulls of obligation to the 
overall legal order may in rare cases achieve a supervening legal 
force.
97 If such cases exist, as I believe they do, then threshold 
deontology suggests an apt conceptualization of how officials ought to 
 
  93. See F REDERICK  SCHAUER,  PLAYING BY THE RULES:  A  PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 128–34 (1991). 
  94. See  id. at 31–34. 
  95. See  id. at 130–33; cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional 
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1439–40 (2011) (describing how ex ante rules allow lawmakers 
to grant decisionmaking power to an agent while constraining how the agent exercises her 
discretion).  
 96.  See supra notes 33–35, 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 97.  Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, supra note 49, at 684 (“An officer 
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proceed: it may sometimes be constitutionally permissible or even 
obligatory for officials to violate constitutional or statutory norms 
that do not cease to apply. Or, adapting Lincoln’s formulation, we 
might say that although an official’s deviation from applicable norms 
was not “strictly legal,”
98 what the official did was nevertheless legally 
right and even legally mandatory, in light of the consequences that 
the deviation was necessary to achieve or avert.
99 Nevertheless, if the 
analogy of threshold deontology is illuminating, then an official who 
deviates from the strictly legal norms that ordinarily apply, even if 
legally justified in having done so, will nonetheless have the legal 
equivalent of morally dirty hands. Officials who honor the law ought 
not claim entitlements to behave in ways that are not strictly legal and 
set a precedent for other officials to do so as well. The fact that their 
doing so is the lesser evil, and even the lesser legal evil, does not 
make their actions wholly and unproblematically “all right” from a 
legal perspective.
100 
C.  Contrasts with Other Theories of Presidential Power 
If the position can be sustained that there can be constitutionally 
justified deviations from constitutional and statutory norms—
typically involving cases in which consequentialist imperatives 
override the rules that would normally determine what an official 
legally ought to do—several contrasts would define the location of 
this two-tiered theory in debates about constitutional and statutory 
interpretation. First, the two-tiered view, although otherwise agnostic 
regarding the best general theory of statutory or constitutional 
interpretation, rejects any theory that characterizes all interpretation 
as reflecting a single, unified, and harmoniously continuous set of 
interpretive principles. Some such theories would deny either the 
existence of or the need for emergency principles.
101 Others would 
portray all legal interpretation as occurring along a sliding scale, on 
which practical considerations and imperatives always influence 
interpretation, with the extent of influence varying in degree as the 
 
  98. See  supra  note 51 and accompanying text. 
 99.  Cf. B ENJAMIN  A.  KLEINERMAN,  THE  DISCRETIONARY  PRESIDENT:  THE  PROMISE 
AND PERIL OF EXECUTIVE POWER 184 (2009) (arguing that presidential “action outside of and 
especially against the Constitution” can “become constitutional” when necessary to national 
survival (emphasis omitted)). 
 100. Cf. supra note 85. 
  101.  Gross calls this approach “the Business as Usual model.” See Gross, supra note 3, at 
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significance of interpretive consequences rises or falls.
102 In contrast 
with these positions, two-tiered theory is discontinuous. It recognizes 
one set of principles for ordinary cases and another set for 
extraordinary cases. Only when the consequences rise very 
dramatically does a shift occur to the extraordinary principles that 
could constitutionally justify what otherwise would be unequivocal 
constitutional wrongs. 
Second, two-tiered interpretive theory denies that a president 
who claims extraordinary powers necessarily acts 
extraconstitutionally by asserting an entitlement—rooted either in 
morality or necessity—to act without the authority, and in violation, 
of the law. In defending the position that emergency powers should 
be conceptualized as extraconstitutional, Professor Oren Gross relies 
heavily on an interest in creating the proper incentives for official 
action.
103 In his view, it is better for a president who engages in 
extraordinary action, unjustified by ordinary legal principles, to 
acknowledge outlaw status and petition the public for forgiveness. 
Otherwise, the temptation for officials to intrude recklessly on civil 
liberties in the name of national security might grow too large. 
In my estimation, this theoretical approach mischaracterizes 
what happens—including what is experienced by both officials and 
the public—in the kind of cases for which two-tiered theory 
postulates the existence of extraordinary norms. When President 
Lincoln ordered executive officials to pay money out of the Treasury 
despite the absence of a congressional appropriation, or to defy a writ 
of habeas corpus issued by the Chief Justice, he did not ask those 
officials to join him in acting wholly outside the law. To equate his 
actions with a temporary coup d’état—or the response of Congress 
and the public as acquiescing in one—would radically misrepresent 
what I imagine to be the self-understanding of all relevant parties. 
Lincoln exercised powers granted to him by the Constitution as 
appropriately interpreted pursuant to a two-level theory.
104 Indeed, in 
exercising those powers Lincoln may well have discharged his 
constitutional duty to take care that the laws were faithfully executed 
 
  102. See  id. at 1059 (describing a “model of interpretive accommodation” that “seeks to 
apply ordinary rules in times of crisis, but to change the scope of such rules by way of 
emergency-minded interpretation”). 
 103. See id. at 1096–1133 (propounding and defending an “Extra-Legal Measures model” of 
emergency governmental powers). 
 104. See LAZAR, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that questions about appropriate conduct by 
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and to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution under 
extraordinary circumstances.
105 The powers that Lincoln claimed were 
dangerous ones, requiring deviation from ordinary constitutional 
norms, but they nonetheless furnished a valid constitutional 
justification for his actions under the circumstances.
106 Indeed, when 
extraordinary claims of executive authority come before courts, 
courts should sometimes uphold those claims as a matter of law. I 
believe this to be true, for example, with regard to most of the actions 
that Lincoln explained and defended in his July 4 Message to 
Congress and also with regard to President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
destroyers-for-bases deal.
107 
Third, two-tiered interpretive theory, as framed in light of the 
analogy to threshold deontology, differs from Professor Michael 
Paulsen’s theory that the text of the presidential oath gives the 
president the duty, which implies a corresponding power, to do 
whatever is necessary to “preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution.”
108 In contrast with Paulsen’s theory, two-tiered 
interpretive theory does not claim to be either originalist or strictly 
textualist. The defense of two-tiered theory resides in a mix of its 
capacity to explain constitutional intuitions that most of us would be 
unwilling to renounce and its normative attractiveness.
109 In further 
contrast with Paulsen’s theory, two-tiered theory is not limited in 
application to cases involving existential threats to the United States 
 
 105. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1263 (asserting that the presidential oath gives the 
president the duty as well as the power to take reasonably necessary measures to preserve the 
nation from existential threats). 
  106.  The proposal of Professors Charles Fried and Gregory Fried—to analogize the conduct 
of presidents who have justifiably violated normally applicable legal norms to “civil 
disobedience,” see CHARLES FRIED & GREGORY FRIED, BECAUSE IT IS WRONG: TORTURE, 
PRIVACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE AGE OF TERROR 148–58 (2010)—invites similar 
objections. The analogy fails to explain how a president who violated legal norms that would 
clearly apply unless emergencies were legally relevant could act with the authority or even with 
the apparent authority—in the eyes of the subordinate officials to whom presidential directives 
issue—of law. There may be some presidential directives that would lack either actual or 
apparent authority, but President Lincoln’s would not have numbered among them.  
  107.  I thus believe that Chief Justice Taney erred by ruling in Ex parte Merryman that 
President Lincoln lacked authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus at a 
time of extraordinary exigency when Congress was not in session and thus unavailable to 
authorize a suspension. See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147–48, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) 
(No. 9487). 
  108.  U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8; see Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1263. 
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or imminent threats of the loss of many lives from foreign attack.
110 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Paulsen’s theory is framed 
exclusively as one of empowerment. By contrast, two-tiered theory 
incorporates conceptual and rhetorical resources for marking 
invocations of extraordinary principles as inherently suspect, even 
dirty-handed, and for resisting the spread of precedents established 
by emergency cases to less exigent ones. 
D.  The Limits of the Analogy to Threshold Deontology 
Although threshold deontology offers a helpful analogy for the 
development of a two-tiered theory of legal interpretation, it could of 
course be questioned whether threshold deontology is the best moral 
theory or even a tenable one.
111 Largely for the reasons advanced by 
Nagel, which I briefly summarized above, moral theories that 
distinguish between the rights-based norms applicable to ordinary 
cases and the consequentialist imperatives that very occasionally 
override such norms seem more persuasive to me than do single-track 
theories. I am strongly drawn to the view that life sometimes presents 
moral dilemmas in which any course of action entails moral costs and 
that what is morally obligatory under the circumstances could be 
aptly characterized as a lesser evil. 
I have not, however, attempted to argue specifically in favor of 
threshold deontology as the preferred form of moral theory. Even if it 
were within my competence to contribute to the literature on moral 
philosophy, my current purposes make such an effort unnecessary. 
The analogy of moral analysis to legal interpretive theory is only an 
analogy. It is wholly possible that a position in moral philosophy 
could suggest an attractive approach to legal interpretation even if it 
failed to provide the best framework for thinking about purely moral 
issues. 
The most serious threat to the utility of the analogy that 
threshold deontology provides for assessing approaches to legal 
interpretation might appear to lie in the argument, most prominently 
 
  110.  Although Paulsen is slightly elusive about when “the constitutional principle of 
necessity” would apply, he appears to link it to the imperative of “defend[ing] the fundamental 
survival of the United States and its people.” Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1290. 
 111. For sustained criticism, see Larry Alexander, Deontological Constraints in a 
Consequentialist World: A Comment on Law, Economics and Morality, JERUSALEM  REV. 
LEGAL STUD., Aug. 2011, at 75 [hereinafter Alexander, Deontological Constraints]; and Larry 
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advanced by Professor Larry Alexander, that threshold deontology is 
conceptually incoherent.
112 According to Alexander, threshold 
deontologists lack the resources to identify, in advance, the points at 
which one set of governing principles gives way to another and to 
explain why the thresholds lie exactly where they do.
113 
In considering Alexander’s argument, it bears noting that his 
objection would vanish if the analogy that I proposed were to a 
theory that offered the same prescription as threshold deontology for 
rule-based moral analysis until the point at which that approach 
became exorbitantly costly, but that presented itself as a sophisticated 
form of rule consequentialism.
114 Such a theory could potentially 
explain why rule-based moral decisionmaking would tend to promote 
the best overall consequences in ordinary cases but affirm that the 
calculus shifts above some threshold.
115 Accordingly, even if threshold 
deontology were conceptually incoherent, the analogy that I wish to 
draw could rely instead on a form of two-tiered consequentialism with 
almost precisely identical behavioral prescriptions. 
I do not believe, however, that threshold deontology is 
incoherent in the disqualifying sense of precluding reasoned, 
rationally defensible moral decisionmaking. As a matter of practical 
necessity, all moral reasoning must begin with moral conviction.
116 I 
cannot reason morally without testing moral claims against moral 
beliefs that I already hold.
117 And if one’s unshakable convictions 
commit one to deontology in ordinary cases, but the Kantian demand 
to adhere to ordinary principles of right even if the heavens should 
fall strikes one as literally unbelievable in cases of almost certainly 
impending catastrophe, then one must reason from those starting 
points. In marking the thresholds at which ordinary principles cease 
to control, one must be prepared to give reasons, but within any 
 
 112. See generally Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, supra note 111.  
 113. See id. at 905–10 
 114. See id. at 910–11. 
  115.  For an example of two-tier consequentialism, see R.M. Hare, Rules of War and Moral 
Reasoning, 1 PHIL.  &  PUB.  AFF. 166, 174–78 (1972) (arguing that moral thought needs to 
operate on at least two levels, with first-order thinking normally being rule-based rather than 
employing case-by-case utility calculations, and with second-order thinking—by which ordinary 
norms are defined, defended, and adjusted—being uncompromisingly utilitarian). 
 116. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 67 (2011) (“[W]e cannot justify a 
moral judgment . . . without relying on further moral convictions or assumptions.”).  
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moral system the capacity to give more reasons will at some point run 
out.
118 
In anticipation of decision in cases of moral conflict, Alexander 
maintains that threshold deontologists must either offer algorithmic 
specifications of what becomes permissible under which 
circumstances or accept the conclusion—which he thinks 
disqualifying—that their theory requires “arbitrary” judgments.
119 But 
this objection depends on questionable assumptions about what 
constitutes unacceptable arbitrariness. For example, in Alexander’s 
view, even a carefully considered decision, based on an assessment of 
all pertinent factors, would apparently fall within the condemnation if 
all of the considerations were not capable of reduction to a common 
currency. If, however, there simply is no common currency—as 
threshold deontologists maintain—and if one does the best one can to 
deliberate and explain a conflicted moral judgment, then I am 
doubtful that the charge of arbitrariness is a perspicuous one. 
At bottom, Professor Alexander’s argument relies on an 
undefended assumption that moral reality somehow satisfies the 
natural human craving for algorithmically correct answers, capable of 
statement in advance, to all moral issues. I see no reason to credit that 
assumption. To put the point differently, and to anticipate an issue 
that will arise recurrently in the remainder of this Article, I do not 
think it incumbent on either threshold deontologists or proponents of 
two-tiered legal theories to incorporate within their theories a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying the thresholds that 
would justify deviations from ordinarily applicable moral or 
interpretive principles. At some point, rules and principles must 
depend for their application on a faculty of judgment that is not itself 
rule-governed;
120 otherwise, the demand for rules for the application 
of rules would descend into infinite regress.
121 The more that can be 
said about where particular thresholds lie, and in advance, the better. 
Rational consistency is not just a desideratum, but a requirement, of 
defensible moral as well as legal decisionmaking. Nonetheless, in 
seeking advance specification of what sound moral judgment 
requires, one cannot properly demand more precision than the nature 
 
 118. See DWORKIN, supra note 116, at 37–38, 67–68; SCANLON, supra note 117, at 64–72. 
 119. See Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, supra note 111, at 905–10. 
 120. RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 8–9 (1983). 
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of the subject matter permits.
122 Almost invariably, real-world 
problems will require assessments of likely consequences under 
circumstances of greater or lesser uncertainty involving multiple 
dimensions. 
III.  TOWARD A TWO-TIERED INTERPRETIVE THEORY 
With Part II having sketched in conceptual terms how the 
analogy of threshold deontology could help to inspire a two-tiered 
theory of legal interpretation, I now want to discuss more concretely 
what such a theory might look like. I state that ambition slightly 
equivocally because it is important to distinguish between the concept 
of a two-tiered theory, which is formal or abstract, and particular 
versions of two-tiered theory, which are necessarily substantive. In 
other words, there could, in principle, be a variety of two-tiered 
interpretive theories. Although agreeing that legality operates on two 
levels, the proponents of different versions of two-tiered theory might 
differ about the circumstances under which ordinary interpretive 
principles should yield and about what could ultimately be justified 
under those circumstances. In this Part, my principal aim is to 
elaborate the central questions that any substantive two-tiered theory 
would need to address. But I shall also try to give a flavor of how two-
tiered analysis might work in practice by offering substantive 
comment on both historical and contemporary examples of expansive 
claims of executive power. 
A.  Principles of Ordinary Interpretation 
Within a two-tiered framework, evaluation of any claim of 
presidential authority properly begins with “ordinary” principles of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. As I have tried to make 
clear, however, the formal or abstract idea of two-tiered interpretive 
theory involves no specification of what those principles ought to be. 
It says only that whatever principles anyone holds already require 
supplementation by a set of extraordinary principles, framed for the 
assessment of claims of executive power in great, exigent, or 
emergency cases. Although taking people’s ordinary interpretive 
theories as given, I assume, as I have said, that nearly everyone’s 
 
 122. Cf. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHAEN ETHICS, bk. I, at 2 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“Our discussion will be adequate if its degree of clarity 
fits the subject matter; for we should not seek the same degree of exactness in all arguments 
alike.”).  FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
2013]  INTERPRETING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 379 
theory will be consequence-sensitive to some extent. Accordingly, I 
would expect the application of ordinary principles to leave the 
president with impressively broad powers, wholly without regard to 
those that could be justified only if extraordinary, second-tiered 
principles applied. I shall return to this issue in Part IV. Nevertheless, 
the powers that could plausibly be justified under any first-tier theory 
would be less sweeping than those that the president has claimed 
(without distinguishing between first- and second-tier cases) in the 
past. Moreover, as Part IV will explain, the availability of 
extraordinary, second-tier principles for truly exigent cases should 
alleviate some of the pressure that currently exists to permit highly 
expansive interpretations of presidential power pursuant to ostensibly 
ordinary interpretive principles—regardless of the first-tier theory 
that one embraces. 
B.  The Threshold Triggering Second-Tier Interpretive Principles 
Just as threshold deontologists need to identify the thresholds 
above which ordinarily applicable moral principles cease to determine 
what conscientious moral agents ought to do, two-tiered legal theories 
require judgments about the magnitude of the consequences needed 
to justify deviations from ordinary interpretive principles. Some 
defenders of extraordinary presidential emergency powers might limit 
the occasions for their invocation to existential threats to the United 
States as a democratic political community or, possibly in addition, to 
imminent risks to very large numbers of American lives.
123 Abraham 
Lincoln would represent the paradigm of a president confronting an 
existential threat. Tested against an existential threat requirement, 
any other historical cases would raise questions of how immediate a 
threat would need to be, or how low the odds of its realization would 
have to fall, for it to fit the definition. For example, did Hitler’s 
Germany pose an existential threat to the United States at the time of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s destroyers-for-bases deal in 1940? 
My own judgment would be that to restrict justifications based 
on practical imperatives exclusively to cases of demonstrably 
existential threats would set the bar too high. For example, I think the 
destroyers-for-bases deal should pass muster on grounds involving the 
 
 123. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1290 (defending extraordinary presidential powers in 
cases of “indispensable necessity” and identifying “national survival” and protection against 
attacks that would threaten the nation’s capacity to provide continuing protection against 
enemies as the only interests that “surely” come within that category). FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
380  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  63:347 
threat that a Nazi-dominated Europe would have posed to the 
overall, long-term national interest, even if national survival was not 
strictly at stake.
124 To cite another example, the national interest in 
extricating U.S. hostages from Iran in 1981, and in resolving the 
surrounding crisis, seem to me to justify President Ronald Reagan’s 
claim of authority—which I think would have been impossible to 
sustain otherwise—to enter into an agreement nullifying pending suits 
against Iran in U.S. courts.
125 
Nevertheless, the destroyers-for-bases deal, in particular, may 
help to illustrate the way in which even extraordinary claims of 
presidential authority that are ultimately constitutionally justified 
may have a dirty-handed aspect. During true emergencies, time 
pressures will almost always make constitutional amendment 
infeasible. But presidents, rather than asserting normally untenable 
claims about the import of existing statutes, could often request that 
Congress authorize steps that they think vital to the national interest. 
In contrast with Abraham Lincoln’s situation at the outset of the Civil 
War—when Congress was not in session—Franklin Roosevelt was in 
a position to seek statutory authorization for a transfer of destroyers 
to Britain, but he could not persuade Congress to relax statutory 
restrictions on his powers.
126 In making what in other circumstances 
would have been the legally insupportable claim that no 
congressional action was necessary, Roosevelt not only deviated from 
normally applicable interpretive principles, but also violated ordinary 
constitutional norms governing the distribution of power between 
Congress and the president when a majority of Congress did not 
agree that emergency justified his chosen course of action. In a sense 
of the legal “ought” that does not wholly dissolve even when 
impending consequences ultimately establish a president’s action as 
 
  124.  British Prime Minister Winston Churchill maintained at the time that without the 
destroyers, Britain might be unable to hold the English Channel and would be in peril of falling 
to Hitler. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1044. “Roosevelt would later describe the 
destroyer deal as the most important action in the reinforcement of the United States’s own 
national defense since the Louisiana Purchase.” Id. at 1046. 
 125. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 658 (1981); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra 
note 11, at 86 (noting that in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court construed a statute 
“[e]nacted to regulate and constrain executive action during international economic crises . . . to 
grant broad executive power”).  
  126.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1045. President Roosevelt sought, and won, 
congressional approval for aid to Britain after the 1940 elections. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 
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legally justified, presidents ought not arrogate to themselves powers 
to override normally applicable and persisting constitutional norms. 
C.  Enduring Demands of Law Even in Emergency Conditions 
A third, partially interconnected dimension along which the idea 
of a two-tiered theory of legal interpretation requires specification 
involves the limits on what can be justified as a matter of law even 
under exigent circumstances. All proponents of two-tiered theories 
should reject the propositions that emergency knows no law
127 and 
that in times of war, the laws go silent.
128 Just as threshold deontology 
is a theory about morality’s dictates in exigent circumstances, and not 
a counsel to forsake morality when the costs become too high, two-
tiered theories of constitutional law remain such in extraordinary 
cases. For example, the powers that two-tiered theory recognizes are 
the powers of constitutionally established offices. Although 
constitutional forms may require adaptation, they should not be 
abandoned—as President Lincoln recognized when he sought after-
the-fact congressional ratification for most of the emergency steps 
that he took at the beginning of the Civil War. Nevertheless, 
proponents of two-tiered theories may reasonably disagree about 
what becomes acceptable under emergency conditions. 
An illustration may emerge from the notorious “torture memos” 
of the Bush administration,
129 produced at a time when executive 
officials could plausibly have thought that the United States was 
subject to exigent threat. Those memoranda advanced two lines of 
argument. First, they defined the “torture” prohibited by federal 
statutes and international treaties exceedingly narrowly.
130 Second, 
they maintained that Congress could not, in any event, validly restrict 
the president from authorizing interrogational methods that he 
thought necessary for national security.
131 
 
 127. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646–52 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (rejecting an argument predicated on the assumption that “necessity knows no 
law”). 
 128. Cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
225 (1998) (“The laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat 
different voice.”).  
 129. E.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in T HE  TORTURE  PAPERS:  THE 
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).  
 130. See id. at 173–99. 
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From the perspective of a two-tiered interpretive theory, the 
most palpable error in the Bush administration’s analysis lay in its 
proposed normalization of presidential authority to override 
prohibitions that Congress had plainly intended to establish.
132 Harder 
questions would have arisen if the Bush administration had asserted 
the more limited claim that the statutory prohibition against torture 
would infringe inherent presidential powers as applied, for example, 
to a case in which there was specific evidence of an impending 
terrorist calamity, as well as strong reason to believe that a particular 
detainee possessed relevant information, and all other possible means 
of averting the disaster had been exhausted. In those hypothetical 
circumstances, a two-tiered theory would need to take seriously the 
possibility that exigency might justify a claim of inherent executive 
authority that could not be justified otherwise. 
To take an argument seriously is not, of course, necessarily to 
embrace it. In a book entitled Because It Is Wrong, Professors Charles 
Fried and Gregory Fried argue that torture is so inherently morally 
evil that there could never be a moral or legal justification for 
resorting to it;
133 whatever other prohibitions might yield to exigency, 
they maintain that the proscription against torture does not. Others 
who interpret the Constitution in light of an analogy to two-track 
moral theories might reach a different conclusion. For example, 
Professor Walzer has argued that in a case in which interrogational 
torture offered the last, best hope for avoiding a nearly certain 
calamity, a morally conscientious official would be constrained to 
 
  132.  The memoranda have been widely condemned. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 89, at 
148–51; Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193, 199–207 (2010). The 
Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility subsequently found that the analysis 
in some of the legal opinions constituted “professional misconduct.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE 
OF  PROF’L  RESPONSIBILITY,  INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL  COUNSEL’S 
MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S 
USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 254 (2009), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf.  A reviewing 
official rejected the finding of professional misconduct but agreed that the legal work was 
“flawed” and reflected “poor judgment.” Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy 
Att’y Gen., to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to 
the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of 
Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected 
Terrorists 64–69 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAG
MargolisMemo100105.pdf. 
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acquire morally dirty hands.
134 In such a case, the idea of a two-tiered 
theory of legal interpretation frames a question the resolution of 
which requires a further act of judgment concerning which reasonable 
people will understandably disagree. 
IV.  THE PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF TWO-TIERED THEORY 
FOR THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF PAST EXECUTIVE PRECEDENTS 
In the current state of American constitutional practice, a two-
tiered theory of executive authority cannot deliver on the promises 
that I have made on its behalf unless it offers normatively attractive 
prescriptions regarding what we ought to do, going forward, with past 
executive precedents. If great cases have made bad law, or if they 
have encouraged the development of an interpretive culture within 
the executive branch in which executive precedents now give 
plausible support to nearly any claim of national security authority 
that the president might wish to make, how would the adoption of a 
two-tiered theory alter the existing state of affairs? 
In schematic terms, this question permits a plain, blunt answer: 
two-tiered theory prescribes that we should begin immediately to 
reassess old cases to determine whether they constitute precedents 
entitled to guide thinking about new ones. In other words, we should 
accord executive-branch precedents as much—and only as much—
precedential authority as a two-tiered theory entitles them to.
135 
On one view, historical practice has validated a scope of 
presidential authority, including interpretive authority, that now must 
be accepted,
136 even if it could not have been justified in the first 
instance. But arguments to this effect claim too much. Although a 
good legal theory must presumptively fit most (though not all) 
judicial precedents,
137 unilateral executive judgments, which are 
typically rendered by nonneutral decisionmakers without careful 
testing through the adversary process, should trigger more critical 
appraisal. One pertinent factor involves whether other branches have 
 
 134. See Walzer, supra note 13, at 166–68. 
  135. See R ONALD  DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY 118–23 (4th prtg. 1978) 
(discussing the need for legal theories to include a “theory of mistakes”).  
 136. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 
29, 33–35 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994) (describing but criticizing the view 
that custom now vindicates claims of presidential authority to use military force prior to 
congressional approval).  
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approved—not merely tolerated—past, unilateral assertions of 
executive authority.
138 Another factor, which two-tiered theory also 
emphasizes, involves the force of the arguments that either were or 
retrospectively could be asserted in a particular precedent’s defense. 
Although “it is folly to think a sound constitutional judgment can be 
made . . . without facing up to what the historical practice between the 
branches has actually shown,”
139 mere recitations of what presidents 
have done or asserted in the past cannot resolve the scope of 
presidential and congressional war powers. 
A.  Identifying and Applying Valid Second-Tier Precedents 
Within a two-tiered framework that reflects this attitude, I 
believe that executive precedents can have at least a marginal 
influence in determining when exigencies are sufficiently great to 
warrant an invocation of second-tier principles. For example, I would 
point to the general, retrospective approbation of President 
Roosevelt’s destroyers-for-bases exchange as indicative that an 
imminent, existential threat is not an absolute prerequisite.
140 
Nevertheless, executive precedent cannot compromise the basic 
architecture of two-tiered interpretive theory. 
If executive precedents were parsed through the lens of two-
tiered theory, the most celebrated great cases of the American past—
including those involving Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt—would 
cease to provide any foundation whatsoever for claims of executive 
authority in relatively more mundane cases. In this respect, two-tiered 
interpretive theory calls for a healthy revision within, but not a total 
overhaul of, existing practice. For example, the Obama 
administration has generally made selective decisions about which 
precedents to rely on in defending its claims of executive prerogative. 
In justifying its initial commitment of forces to the NATO operation 
in Libya, it thus eschewed reliance not only on precedents set by 
 
  138.  Although it is widely recognized that executive precedents take on elevated stature 
when other branches have “acquiesced” in them, see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, 686 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11, 613 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915), 
acquiescence need not signify thoughtful endorsement on constitutional grounds, and 
sometimes it does not even signal endorsement at all. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 
448 (observing that “where acquiescence is the touchstone of the analysis, the standard for 
legislative acquiescence should be high”); Glennon, supra note 73, at 137–44 (discussing indicia 
of acquiescence). 
  139.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1100. 
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Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt, but also on the dubious conclusion 
reached by the Truman administration that it did not need 
congressional authorization to enter the war in Korea.
141  
An unarticulated insistence on distinguishing ordinary- from 
extraordinary-tier cases may also underlie at least some of the 
Justices’ reasoning in the Youngstown case.
  In defense of the 
president’s authority to seize and operate the nation’s steel mills, the 
Truman administration cited a number of past instances in which 
presidents had asserted authority to seize property unilaterally.
142 The 
only honest distinction of some of the precedents, including three 
seizures by President Roosevelt during the six months prior to Pearl 
Harbor, may have been that the earlier cases involved a truly exigent 
threat to national security, whereas the circumstances of Youngstown, 
in which the president had an alternative, statutorily authorized 
mechanism for averting a nationwide steel strike, did not.
143 Two-
tiered theory would thus make explicit what Justice Black’s majority 
opinion either left implicit or papered over entirely, even if it cannot 
supply rule-like criteria for marking the divide between exigent and 
nonexigent circumstances in a world in which knowledge of how the 
future will unfold rarely approaches perfection.
144 
If two-tiered theory’s prescription for precedent-parsing were 
adopted, some past assertions of presidential authority that could be 
justified only if assigned to the exigent, second-tier category—such as 
President Truman’s initiation of U.S. involvement in the Korean 
War—might pose testing issues. In asserting that if the Korean 
precedent could be justified, it would need to be pursuant to second-
tier reasoning, I assume, as most constitutional scholars have 
 
 141. See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., supra note 63, at 12–13. 
 142. See, e.g., MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 154–58 (1977) (discussing the administration’s arguments); Patricia L. 
Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 233 (Christopher 
H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (same).  
 143. Cf. F ELDMAN,  supra note 33, at 362 (criticizing Justice Frankfurter’s concurring 
opinion in Youngstown, which acknowledged the relevance of historical practice, for its failure 
adequately to distinguish “[t]hese now embarrassing incidents [that] seemed precisely parallel to 
what Truman had done”). 
 144. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952) (“It is said 
that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession of private business 
enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby 
lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the 
powers vested by the Constitution ‘in the Government of the United States, or in any 
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concluded, that the Constitution at least normally does not authorize 
the president to wage war unilaterally except in response to a sudden 
attack.
145 Nor, I would argue, could second-tier principles—which 
reject the proposition that emergency and perceived emergency know 
no law—justify a unilateral presidential prerogative to commit the 
nation to a major armed conflict. However practically imperative war-
fighting might appear to the president, in Korea or elsewhere,
146 
Congress’s solemn concurrence ought to be necessary before the 
executive branch can commit the nation to protracted, large-scale 
hostilities.
147 
In any event, even if one thought that the imperative for the 
United States to respond swiftly to an attack on South Korea justified 
the Truman administration’s unilateral decision to rush troops into 
battle under second-tier interpretive principles,
148 that precedent 
would provide no valid support for presidential claims of authority to 
enter large-scale, protracted hostilities without congressional 
authorization when ample time exists for Congress to deliberate and 
act. Accordingly, the Korean War did not furnish a controlling 
precedent for arguments by the George H.W. Bush administration 
that the president could initiate and wage the first Persian Gulf War 
without congressional authorization if he so chose.
149 Nor could the 
 
 145. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. On the acknowledged authority of the 
president to repel sudden attacks, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the 
Presidency, 93 COLUM.  L.  REV. 1, 32–38 (1993); and Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233–36, 285 (2001). 
 146. See Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United 
Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 623 (1993) (noting that the Truman administration “had little time to 
wait” as “the military situation [of South Korea] deteriorated” in the face of a North Korean 
attack).  
 147. See Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why 
Methodology Matters, 106 YALE  L.J. 845, 887 (1996) (reviewing FISHER,  supra  note 20) 
(emphasizing the importance of congressional authorization “to ensure American combat forces 
that the country is behind them; to convey American resolve to adversaries as well as allies; and 
to reduce the chances that Congress will precipitously undercut a deployment in the face of 
adversity”). 
  148.  Rather than relying on the arguably peculiar exigency of the situation, the State 
Department memorandum defending the action, U.S. Dep’t of State, Authority of the President 
To Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP’T ST. BULL. 173 (1950), articulated the strong view that 
the president, as the Commander in Chief, has “full control over the use” of the armed forces. 
Id. at 173. In support, it cited numerous (smaller) conflicts in which the armed forces had been 
sent abroad, without congressional authorization, “for protection purposes.” See id. at 177–78. 
The memorandum also emphasized that important national interests—including the authority of 
the United Nations—justified the operations. See id. at 174–77.  
  149.  In testimony before Congress, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney “pointed to 
Korea in particular as an illustration of well-established principles concerning the president’s FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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Korean precedent persuasively support the claim of the George W. 
Bush administration that the president did not need congressional 
approval before launching a war to topple Saddam Hussein.
150 
A defensible version of two-tiered interpretive theory would also 
give no cover to presidential claims that general and enduring threats 
to national security—such as those attending the Cold War or the 
War on Terror—suffice to authorize all actions the president might 
think prudent or otherwise advisable.
151 Within a two-tiered theory, a 
general threat that justifies an extraordinary application of legal 
norms in one situation may not warrant a comparably extraordinary 
application of legal norms in another, even during the same period. 
Whether the stakes are high enough and whether other, 
straightforwardly lawful measures would suffice needs to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. The notions of dirty hands and of 
constitutionally justified violations of ordinarily governing rules signal 
that the deviations from baseline constitutional principles do not 
merit either general or unconditional approbation, even in 
threatening times. 
B.  Precedent and Presidential Authority in First-Tier Cases 
It is a further question how to parse claims of executive authority 
in the national security domain that depend on executive precedents 
involving first- or ordinary-tier cases. Once analysis and argument 
focus on first-tier principles and precedents—as two-tiered theory 
demands that they typically should—two-tiered theory will frequently 
not, by itself, furnish a determinate answer to the question whether 
an assertion of unilateral executive authority is justified. As I have 
emphasized, two-tiered theory operates as a supplement to whatever 
first-tier theories of constitutional and statutory interpretation 
adherents already embrace; it does not dictate a full set of first-tier 
interpretive principles, including principles concerning the 
 
authority to send U.S. forces to combat” and grouped that episode alongside smaller actions to 
distill a legal rule that congressional authorization was unnecessary. Stromseth, supra note 146, 
at 645 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options 
and Implications, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 702 
(1990) (statement of Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense)). 
 150. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 20, at 215–30. 
  151.  In every year since 2001, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have declared 
that the United States is in a state of emergency arising from terrorist threats. E.g., 
Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks, 77 Fed. 
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significance of past executive precedent. As I shall explain, however, 
two-tiered theory may carry implications about the need for line 
drawing to enforce the structural distinction between normal and 
exigent cases. 
For my own part, applying my own first-tier interpretive theory, I 
would interpret both Article II and the War Powers Resolution—
without need for reliance on extraordinary, emergency-based 
principles—as giving the president latitude to take unilateral steps to 
protect important U.S. interests through relatively modest, short-term 
uses of military force. By requiring the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
hostilities after sixty days if Congress has not authorized a longer 
involvement, and by authorizing an additional thirty-day extension 
when necessary for the safety of U.S. forces,
152 the War Powers 
Resolution implicitly recognizes a presidential prerogative to conduct 
military interventions of limited duration and short of war.
153 I would 
also interpret Article II as conferring presidential powers consistent 
with what Professor John Hart Ely described as the “constitutional 
understanding [that] was quite consistently honored from the framing 
until 1950.”
154 Pursuant to that understanding as Ely characterized it, 
presidents could deploy troops abroad to protect U.S. interests when 
they believed that immediate action was vital, and that major, long-
term hostilities were unlikely to ensue, but “subject always to the core 
command underlying the constitutional accommodation . . . that 
[they] come to Congress for approval as soon as possible and 
terminate military action in the event such approval is not 
forthcoming.”
155 Executive precedent is certainly consistent with, and 
 
 152. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 153. See F ISHER,  supra note 20, at 145 (describing the War Powers Resolution as 
“recognizing that the President may use armed force for up to 90 days without seeking or 
obtaining legislative authority”); cf. S CHLESINGER,  supra note 36, at 434–35 (“Before the 
passage of the resolution, unilateral presidential war was a matter of usurpation. Now, at least 
for the first ninety days, it was a matter of law.”). 
  154.  John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1379, 1388–89 (1988). 
 155. Id. at 1388–91; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1056–57 (asserting the 
existence of a prevailing understanding “[b]y the conclusion of the Clinton Administration” that 
although presidents may commit troops in some situations risking hostilities, “any conflict of a 
scale directly comparable to Korea or Vietnam must be carried out with legislative approval”). 
The question whether that presidential power is subject to congressional curtailment has not 
arisen and, in light of the War Powers Resolution, seems unlikely to arise. FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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provides some support for, this conclusion.
156 As Professor Curtis 
Bradley and Dean Trevor Morrison have recognized, however, no 
consensus exists about how precisely to characterize “the scope of the 
President’s authority to initiate military conflicts without 
congressional authorization” or about how far Congress should be 
deemed to have acquiesced in many past assertions of executive 
power.
157 
Especially in the face of such uncertainty, two-tiered theory’s 
recognition of a second tier of exceptional cases should reinforce the 
conviction that there are and must be limits on what ordinary 
interpretive principles can justify, lest the distinction between first- 
and second-tier cases prove pointless in practice. Taking seriously the 
commitment to line drawing that two-tiered theory reflects, I find 
unpersuasive the Obama administration’s claim that the deployment 
of U.S. forces against the resisting Libyan military within Libyan 
territory did not constitute “hostilities” within the meaning of the 
War Powers Resolution. Given both the War Powers Resolution and 
Article II’s recognition of presidential authority to initiate modest, 
short-term military interventions, I have no quarrel with the 
administration’s position that the president acted permissibly in 
commanding U.S. participation in NATO-led military operations in 
Libya in the first instance or with its reliance on the precedents that it 
cited.
158 But even if past executive precedents have a limited capacity 
to gloss statutory meaning, they could not, in my view, suffice to 
establish the counterintuitive proposition—which State Department 
Legal Advisor Koh sought to defend—that “hostilities” do not 
necessarily exist within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution 
even in circumstances marked by the presence of thousands of U.S. 
ground troops, combat, casualties, and a high risk of escalation.
159 
Even the more limited principle that Koh ultimately purported to 
distill from past executive precedents and then to apply—finding an 
absence of hostilities “when U.S. forces engage in a limited military 
mission that involves limited exposure for U.S. troops and limited risk 
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of serious escalation and employs limited military means”
160—imposes 
narrower limits on the term than I believe that ordinary interpretive 
principles will sustain.
161 If steeled to stop great cases from making 
bad law, we should be as resolute to prevent more ordinary cases 
from doing so, especially when the ordinary cases involve executive 
precedents, not clearly acquiesced in by Congress,
162 that strain 
legislative language beyond its common-sense meaning. In the 
absence of sharply etched boundaries on the president’s power to 
initiate military action, any erosion of the War Powers Resolution’s 
durational limit is especially lamentable if, as two-tiered theory 
affirms, significant restraints on presidential authority ought to be 
maintained.
163 
Others will of course disagree with my judgments about the 
Obama administration’s actions in Libya—which, I hasten to add, 
reflected policy aims that I applaud. In disagreeing, moreover, critics 
may take issue not only with my ultimate legal conclusion, but also 
with my suggestion that the structure of two-tiered interpretive theory 
supports my line of reasoning. Acknowledging the scope that two-
tiered theory leaves for disagreement, especially insofar as it fails to 
prescribe a full set of first-tier interpretive principles, I would insist 
only that two-tier theory frames the right issues for debate. At the 
very least, embrace of two-tiered theory would force those making 
and disputing claims of executive authority to argue openly about 
whether exigent necessity justifies a deviation from otherwise-
applicable legal norms, and, if not, about how much straining of those 
norms is consistent with our first-tier commitment to the ideal of the 
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rule of law—under circumstances in which cases of truly exigent 
necessity are already separately provided for. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have appealed to the analogy of threshold 
deontology to argue in favor of a two-tiered theory of constitutional 
and statutory interpretation in cases involving claims of presidential 
power. Like morality, constitutional law incorporates principles that 
can be in fundamental tension with one another. On the one hand, 
the president is appropriately subject to constitutional and legal 
constraints, even in cases in which those constraints produce adverse 
consequences. Although applicable legal norms may be context- and 
consequence-sensitive to a degree, they frequently restrict official 
discretion to do what would be best under the circumstances, based 
on the assumption that officials should be bound by norms from 
which they cannot excuse themselves on a case-by-case basis, even to 
promote the public good. On the other hand, it is a premise of 
constitutional interpretation that the Constitution is not a suicide 
pact. That dictum reflects a deeper recognition that those interpreting 
and implementing the Constitution should respond to consequence-
based imperatives to maintain the constitutional order and to 
promote its most fundamental values, even when ordinary 
interpretive principles would deny them authority to do so, in cases of 
existential threat or when the stakes are otherwise exorbitantly high. 
Analogously to the way in which threshold deontology holds that 
otherwise inviolable moral principles can be overcome when 
adherence to them would have catastrophic consequences, two-tiered 
interpretive theory justifies the president in asserting otherwise 
indefensible claims of executive power in extraordinary cases, but not 
in ordinary ones. Like threshold deontology, however, two-tiered 
interpretive theory permits consequentialist imperatives to override 
otherwise inviolable norms only in narrowly defined circumstances. 
Although the Constitution is not a suicide pact, neither does it license 
substantially unrestricted executive power when nothing remotely 
analogous to suicide, or its avoidance, is at stake. And even when 
invocations of extraordinary interpretive principles can be justified, 
two-tiered interpretive theory would insist that those invocations are 
inherently dirty-handed. In a world in which presidential power has 
too often tended to expand indiscriminately, two-tiered interpretive 
theory furnishes a better conceptual, rhetorical, and political FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:59 PM 
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safeguard than we now have against the normalization of practices 
that ought not become standard, even if they are justified in 
extraordinary cases. 
 